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In relation to religious rights, a distinction can often be drawn between the question of 
interference and the question of justification. This is true of both Article 9 of the ECHR and 
indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010:
2
  whilst Article 9(1) is concerned with 
whether there has been an interference with the right to manifest religion or, Article 9(2) is 
concerned with whether that interference was justified; similarly, once it has been established 
that the claimant has suffered a disadvantage, it is a defence to claims of indirect 
discrimination if the actions were justified.  
 
This distinction between interference and justification allows us to draw a line between the 
cases of Eweida
3
 and Chaplin
4
 on the one hand (which were dismissed on grounds of 
interference) and Ladele
5
 and McFarlane
6
 on the other hand (which were dismissed on 
grounds of justification).    
 
Dealing with Eweida and Chaplin, which are the subject of the first question which the 
Commission asks, it may be argued that there are principled reasons why courts and tribunals 
should refrain from deciding the dispute on grounds of interference.  It should be noted that 
there has been a marked trend towards deciding disputes on grounds of interference in 
relation to both Article 9 and indirect discrimination, which can be traced back to the 
reasoning of the House of Lords in Begum
7
 in which Lord Bingham that interference with 
Article 9 „is not easily established‟.8 In that case, the majority of their Lordships held that 
there would not be an interference with religious freedom where „a person has voluntarily 
accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance 
and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without 
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undue hardship or inconvenience‟.9  Following Begum, a number of lower court decisions 
have dismissed Article 9 claims on the basis that there was no interference with the 
claimant‟s right to religious freedom. 10   The restrictive approach taken was underlined by 
Munby LJ recently in R (Eunice Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby City Council
11
 in which he 
suggested that in relation to Article 9, „interferences in the sphere of employment and 
analogous spheres are readily found to be justified, even where the members of a particular 
religious group will find it difficult in practice to comply‟.12   
 
The reason why courts and tribunals should refrain from determining religious disputes using 
the question of interference is that this judicial tendency to focus upon questions of 
interference or disadvantage might not allow the court to examine the merits of the case. 
Cases concerning religious rights require nuanced, fact-specific judgments, which are best 
reached by focussing upon the question of justification.  The pure focus on the question of 
interference is crude. For instance, the application of the Begum reasoning means that 
wherever the claimant can go to another school, resign their job or take their custom 
elsewhere, then they could not rely on Article 9.
13
  This overly restrictive approach is 
unnecessary because such claims could have been adequately dealt with by focusing upon the 
question of justification.  This is not to say that the „religion or belief‟ argument always needs 
to win.  The cases may still be ultimately dismissed on grounds of justification – but if they 
are then the court or tribunal will have examined whether in that particular social situation, 
that particular interference with the claimant‟s rights was justified.  The decision in Azmi v 
Kirklees Metropolitan Council
14
 provides a good illustration of how the focus on justification 
can lead to nuanced, fact-specific judgments. 
 
Turning specifically to Eweida and Chaplin, these two cases were dismissed on the basis that 
there was no interference (or „disadvantage‟) because the requirement now found in section 
19(2)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 was not met.  This states that there will only be a 
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disadvantage if „it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a 
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it‟.  In 
other words, an act can only constitute indirect discrimination where it would 
(hypothetically) disadvantage those who share the victim‟s religion or belief. It may be 
argued that this requirement is more taxing in relation to religion or belief than other equality 
strands given that religious identities are more malleable: it is possible that two Christians 
will have significantly different views as to what causes them (say) offence. This raises the 
question of how small the pool should be drawn: should we say that those who share the 
same religion or belief must belong to the same religion, the same denomination or the same 
place of worship? It is not surprising, therefore, that this requirement has proved problematic. 
However, the line currently drawn in Eweida and Chaplin is overly restrictive.  
 
The Eweida case concerned a member of check-in staff who wore a silver cross in breach of 
the airline‟s then uniform policy which prohibited visible religious symbols unless their 
wearing was mandatory. The Court of Appeal held that there was no indirect discrimination: 
the uniform policy did not put Christians at a particular disadvantage. There was no evidence 
that practising Christians considered the visible display of the cross to be a requirement of the 
Christian faith and no evidence that the provision created a barrier to Christians employed at 
the airline.  
 
It could, of course, be argued that the decision should not have been based upon the grounds 
of interference at all. Sedley LJ suggested obiter that if it had been held that there was 
indirect discrimination then the claim would nevertheless have been defeated on justification. 
However, even if it is accepted that the court was correct to determine the case this way, the 
approach taken is deeply problematic. The Court of Appeal in deciding what is and what is 
not a requirement of the Christian faith determined a question of religious doctrine. This goes 
against the traditional reluctance of the courts to determine questions of religious doctrine.
15
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Moreover, the fact that other Christian employees had not been affected is not relevant: the 
reference to the comparator is hypothetical.  
 
The decision in Chaplin, which blindly applied Eweida, is even more troubling. This case  
concerned a nurse who wished to wear a crucifix around her neck. Despite evidence that 
another nurse had been asked to remove her cross and chain, the Employment Tribunal held 
that this other nurse had not been put at a particular disadvantage since her religious views 
were not so strong as to lead her to refuse to comply with the policy.  It was held that in order 
for there to be a „particular disadvantage‟, the disadvantage needed to be „noteworthy, 
peculiar or singular‟. This seems to be counter-intuitive. On the face of it, Chaplin was 
disadvantaged and, unlike in Eweida, there was clear evidence that she was not alone. 
Ignoring the other nurse on the basis that her religious objection was not strong enough jars. 
Even if it is accepted that the courts are entitled to conclude that a ban on wearing a cross 
would not disadvantage Christians as a whole, these cases suggest that beliefs held by a few 
individuals (including beliefs held by a minority of believers within a larger religious group) 
are not protected. This contradicts the text of Article 9 which protects both religious groups 
and religious individuals. 
 
Turning to the second question that the Commission asks which deals with Ladele and 
McFarlane, it is significant that these cases were not dismissed on grounds of interference. 
The fact that other Christians are comfortable with same-sex unions was not used to deny 
these claims. This is surely right and underlines how the law has taken an incorrect turn in 
Eweida and Chaplin. The emphasis upon the question of justification in Ladele and 
McFarlane is to be applauded but these judgments are not unproblematic.
16
 The reasoning in 
these cases is problematic since the question of justification has been reduced to a „battle of 
rights‟ analysis.  An „either/or‟ approach has been taken: protection is either we protect 
freedom of religion or we protect the right not to discriminate on grounds of sexual 
orientation. When this analysis is applied, religious rights becomes easily „trumped‟ by the 
right not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
For instance, in Ladele, in reaching the conclusion that there had not been discrimination on 
grounds of religion, the Court of Appeal seemed to emphasize the laudable aim of preventing 
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discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation whilst downplaying the claim of religious 
discrimination.  For Dyson LJ,  
„the aim of the Dignity for All policy was of general, indeed overarching, policy 
significance to Islington, and it also had fundamental human rights, equality and 
diversity implications, whereas the effect on Ms Ladele of implementing the policy 
did not impinge on her religious beliefs: she remained free to hold those beliefs, and 
free to worship as she wished.
17
    
In short, the obligations on the employer not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation 
trumped the rights of the employee not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion or 
belief.  There seems to be no recognition that equality policy protects discrimination on 
grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation.  And the understanding of 
religious freedom in this case seems to be very narrow: as Article 9 makes clear, religious 
freedom is not limited to the right to hold beliefs and worship.  Discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation is clearly wrong but so too is discrimination on grounds of religion. The 
Court of Appeal does not appear to have struck the correct balance in its reasoning.  
 
The approach in Ladele was also followed in McFarlane. In R (Eunice Johns and Owen 
Johns) v Derby City Council
18
 Munby LJ stated that Ladele and McFarlane were authorities 
for the proposition that the need not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation will 
always serve as justification to a religious discrimination claim: 
„it is clear on the authorities that compliance with anti-discrimination legislation 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination and the defendant‟s equal opportunities 
policies to the same effect, together with the need to ensure the non-discriminatory 
service provisions ... will amount to justification.‟19  
In short, these decisions suggest that there a hierarchy of rights now exists with religious 
discrimination coming below sexual orientation.
20
  This approach may well be in breach of 
Article 9 ECHR.  This is not to say that the actions of the respondents in these cases were not 
in fact justified; it is the suggestion that their actions would always be justified by the need 
not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation that is being contested.  
 
                                                 
17
 Ibid, at para. 51.  
18
 [2011] EWHC Admin 375. 
19
 Para 101. 
20
 L Vickers, „Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy‟ (2010) 12 Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal 280-303. 
6 
 
Turning towards the third question posed, the desirability of adopting the Canadian concept 
of „reasonable accommodation‟, it can be suggested that such a move would be unnecessary 
provided that the focus of judicial decision-makers is on the question of justification rather 
than interference. On my understanding, focussing properly on the question of justification by 
looking at the facts, risks and contexts of the particular case would have the same result as 
applying the question of reasonable accommodation.  Asking whether an inference with 
religious freedom is necessary in a democratic society and asking whether it would be 
reasonable to accommodate a particular religious manifestation should lead to the same 
conclusion.  An interference with a person‟s religious rights is justified if it would be 
unreasonable to accommodate them in that particular case. Using the language of reasonable 
accommodation rather than justification may be undesirable as it puts an extra gloss upon the 
legal provisions. However, if this gloss is necessary to ensure that the focus is upon 
justification as opposed to interference, then the concept would be helpful. It should not be 
needed. The letter of the law provides for a test of justification. But the reasoning expressed 
in the four cases discussed above (and several other recent judgments) seems to suggest that 
the concept may well be required.   
